On Hegel's Critique of Kant's Subjectivism in the Transcendental Deduction by Schulting, Dennis
8.1  Introduction
G.W.F. Hegel may rightly be seen as one of the most discerning readers 
of Kant. Of course, already in his early, most expansive, account of 
Kant in Faith and Knowledge (1802) his interpretation is heavily slanted 
towards reading Kant’s philosophy from the perspective of an inchoate 
form of what comes to be known as ‘absolute idealism’, Hegel’s own 
form of idealism that departs from Kant’s transcendental idealism in a 
number of ways. But especially in Faith and Knowledge, and also later 
in the Greater and Lesser Logics, despite his misgivings about Kant’s 
general strategies, Hegel shows great understanding of the spirit and 
at least some of the core details of the Transcendental Deduction 
(TD). He believes that Kant’s notion of the  original-synthetic unity of 
apperception is “one of the most profound principles for speculative 
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development” (WL, 12:22/SL, 520). In contrast to most Kantians,1 
and despite his misgivings about Kant’s procedure (WL, 12:43–44), 
Hegel also rightly sees TD as concerned with deriving the principles of 
the objective determination of representations, i.e. the categories, from 
the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception, from self-
consciousness (WL, 12:18; Enz, 8:117). Further, he rightly sees, contrary 
to some Kantians (see again Chap. 4), that there is no discrepancy 
between the object and the objective unity of representations, which 
“is the unity of the ‘I’ with itself ” (WL, 12:18/SL, 515), that is, 
that the object is identical to the subject’s original-synthetic unity of 
representations. For Hegel, as for Kant, the conditions of the identity 
of self-consciousness are in fact the same conditions that govern the 
identity of the object of my consciousness. Hegel thus correctly identifies 
Kant’s argument, in §17 of the B-Deduction, about the objective unity 
of representations, which is grounded on the transcendental unity of 
self-consciousness and first defines an object, as concerning the very 
objectivity of thought itself,2 indeed, the “identity of concept and thing, 
which is truth” (WL, 12:23/SL, 521; emphasis added).
But it is also clear that Hegel misinterprets many other crucial aspects 
of Kant’s arguments, and that his reading reveals his own philosophical 
agenda against Kant’s general strategy. In this chapter, however, I am 
interested in Hegel’s reading of TD, in Faith and Knowledge, purely as 
an interpretation; I shall not specifically focus on the extent to which 
his interpretation of Kant is biased towards, and forms an integral part 
of his proposal for, absolute idealism, which is only really developed 
in the later accounts of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of 
Logic. The intrinsic value of Hegel’s own system of thought compared to 
Kant’s will thus not be a topic of my discussion here. I also concentrate 
on the early account of Kant in Faith and Knowledge, as I believe that it 
provides the essential framework for Hegel’s view of Kant that remains 
consistent throughout his later accounts of Kant, especially the ones in 
both Logics (WL, 12:17–28 et passim and Enz, 8:112–147) and in the 
lectures on the history of philosophy (VGPh, 20:329–386).3
It has been argued in the literature on the early Hegel (e.g. Düsing 
1995, 2013:169) that Faith and Knowledge is fundamentally framed 











the language and the main interest of Hegel’s essay are indeed firmly 
rooted in it. Among other things, this can be seen from the central use 
of such terminology as ‘absolute identity’, Potenzen, and the general 
dismissiveness with regard to subjectivity in general, which is much 
more outspoken than, or maybe even contradictory to, Hegel’s stance 
in, for example, the Greater Logic of 10 years later. For example, the 
Schellingean roots of Hegel’s account are manifest in a passage such as 
the following, which seems to be taken straight from Schelling’s System 
of Transcendental Idealism, published just 2 years earlier:
If the intellect is to be considered for itself as abstraction of the 
form in its triplicity, it is all one whether it be regarded as intellect of 
consciousness or as intellect of nature, as the form of conscious or of non-
conscious intelligence: just as in the Ego the intellect is thought of as 
conceptualized [intellektualisiert], so in nature it is thought of as realized. 
(GuW, 4:334/FK, 79)
The Schellingean terminology, particularly the notion of ‘absolute iden-
tity’, will nonetheless prove instrumental, I shall argue, in determining 
the way in which Hegel emphasises and weighs particular aspects of TD 
and in establishing the grounds on which Hegel believes Kant does not 
follow through on what he deems are the valuable, genuinely ‘ideal-
ist’ elements, what he calls the Keim des Spekulativen (GuW, 4:335), in 
Kant’s thought. Another closely related reason why Hegel’s account of 
Kant’s TD is of interest is the way in which Hegel can be seen as the 
paradigmatic critic of Kantian nonconceptualism, namely, the thesis that 
some sensible content is not or indeed cannot be subsumed under the 
concepts of the understanding and that intuition does not require the 
functions of the understanding (as Kant argues at B122–3, in the run-
up to TD) (see Chap. 5). Hegel believes that Kant is a nonconceptual-
ist, but also that this contradicts Kant’s firm conceptualism (cf. Hanna 
2013), that is, that Kant espouses two conflicting theories about the rela-
tion between  concepts and sensibility. Hegel thinks that the residual non-
conceptualism in Kant must, on Kantian grounds, be exorcised and that 
properly  conceived, without the unnecessary psychological and empiri-
cist baggage, Kant can be considered a thorough-bred conceptualist.
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This ties in with Hegel’s bemoaning of Kant’s alleged subjectivism (i.e. 
what I called ‘bad subjectivism’ in the introductory Chap. 1), namely, 
the position that the truth about objects is just the truth of our con-
ceptual scheme, without our categories being actually exemplified by the 
real things in themselves. This is the kind of subjectivism that says that 
what we know is true relative merely to our own perspective, because 
that is just how we are psychologically (or culturally, or epistemologi-
cally, etc.) disposed, in contrast to the ‘Critical’ subjectivism that says 
that subjective agency is first constitutive of objectivity, so that there 
would not even be anything objective, any nature, at all without the 
subjective forms of the understanding. But Hegel does not distinguish 
between bad and ‘Critical’ subjectivism. For the Hegel of Faith and 
Knowledge at least, subjectivism is bad tout court.4 Why he thinks Kant’s 
‘Critical’ subjectivism is just another form of bad subjectivism will be 
discussed further below. The charge of subjectivism is directly related to 
the critique of Kant’s so-called restriction thesis, namely, the idealist the-
sis that the categories of experience do not apply to things in themselves, 
which I shall also address.
For reasons of space, I shall not delve into the issues around 
nonconceptualism in relation to Hegel’s critique of Kant (for this, 
see my account in Schulting 2016b).5 Hegel’s critique of Kant’s 
subjectivism and his putative ‘psychological’ idealism is discussed in 
Sect. 8.3. In Sect. 8.4, I address what I believe is the central flaw in 
Hegel’s interpretation of Kant, one by means of which Hegel helps 
himself to reading the productive imagination as Reason itself, in 
clear contrast to Kant’s own view of the imagination as “an effect of 
the understanding on sensibility” (B152; emphasis added). But first, I 
recount Hegel’s more general grounds for his critique of Kant as a type 
of ‘uncritical’ reflection philosophy (Sect. 8.2).
8.2  Critique of Reflection Philosophy
In Faith and Knowledge, Hegel criticises what he calls ‘reflection phi-
losophy’—of which, Hegel claims, Kant’s philosophy is a typical rep-












thinking “the Absolute”, for instead advancing the idea that “Reason 
should renounce its existence [ihr Sein] in the Absolute” (GuW, 4:316/FK, 
56). Hegel criticises Kant for resting content with the limited role of 
Reason as the mere empty form of the empirical and for arguing that 
Reason, in the guise of the understanding, “receives its content” (GuW, 
4:319/FK, 60) only from the opposite at which it is directed, namely 
empirical content (GuW, 4:321) or “empirical reality” (GuW, 4:320/FK, 
61). Further, Hegel finds it hugely problematic that in Kant’s view 
empirical content is considered absolute (GuW, 4:318–319), that is, 
taken for granted as the yardstick by which everything should be meas-
ured. Kant’s idea that conceptual claims about reality can be legitimated 
only if they have a basis in empirical experience is regarded by Hegel as 
wholly antithetical to what genuine philosophy should be aspiring to. It 
is the reason why Hegel criticises Kant’s philosophy for basically being 
a form of “philosophical empiricism” (wissenschaftlichen Empirismus) 
(GuW, 4:321/FK, 63).
Furthermore, for Kant, as Hegel rightly establishes, conceptuality 
and empirical content are connected only insofar as the formal nature 
of the understanding relies on external material content in the case of 
knowledge; that is, conceptual form and material content are combined 
only in terms of their “relative identity” (GuW, 4:320/FK, 61; emphasis 
added), and not conceived of in their “absolute identity” (GuW, 4:325/
FK, 68; emphasis added), whereby concept and content are no longer 
absolutely opposed but genuinely thought in their true rational rela-
tion, even if they cannot be reduced to each other. This is an impor-
tant aspect of Hegel’s critique, which says that Kant is not sufficiently 
consistent in his reflection on the relation between the various linked 
elements in cognition. Hegel speaks of a lack of “reflection on the 
opposition” (Reflexion auf die Entgegensetzung) (GuW, 4:320/FK, 62) 
in Kant, which means that the form of conceptuality, “unity”, and the 
content of the “manifold” (GuW, 4:320/FK, 62) are not thought in 
their reciprocal relation. That is to say, the opposition itself between the 
opposite terms is not thought objectively, so that the manifold is seen 
as the negative of conceptuality and at the same time  conceptuality is 
seen as the negative of the manifold.6 Instead, the opposition is taken 
absolutely, as if it were pre-given (Hegel refers to this as “the stake 
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[Pfahl ] of the absolute antithesis”; GuW, 4:323/FK, 65), so that unity 
of the concept and the empirical manifold “confront one another as 
abstractions” (GuW 4:320/FK, 62). What Hegel means by this is that 
the form of the concept and the matter of the empirical manifold are in 
fact considered, by Kant, to be merely formal, secondary, abstractions of 
the unity that they necessarily form in cognition, a unity that, according 
to Hegel’s reading of Kant, they always already form. The abstractness of 
reflective considerations of the relation between unity and manifold is 
put thusly by Hegel:
[T]he manifold gets determined by the unity […] just as the emptiness of 
identity gets plenished by the manifold […]. Whether active or passive, 
each supervenes to the other in a formal way, as something alien. This 
formal cognition only brings about impoverished identities, and allows the 
antithesis to persist in its complete absoluteness. (GuW, 4:344/FK, 94)
This abstractness is a direct consequence of the mode in which reflec-
tion philosophy operates, namely by way of a reflective approach, 
which starts from a formal point of view—“a fixed Ego-point” ( fixen 
Punkts der Egoität) (GuW 4:332/FK, 77)—and seeks to combine its 
own formality (its forms and procedures) with a content that comes 
from outside it, from what is real (and not formal). The formal point 
of view is the point of view of the understanding as “the principle of 
opposition” (GuW, 4:334/FK, 79), which seeks to unite with external 
content, with which it never really coalesces. Such a formal perspective 
mutatis mutandis translates to all topics that reflection philosophy con-
cerns itself with, regardless of whether it involves issues of theoretical 
or practical philosophy. This issues, as Hegel puts it, in a principle of 
“the absoluteness of finitude and, resulting from it, the absolute antith-
esis of finitude and infinity, reality and ideality, the sensuous and the 
supersensuous, and the beyondness of what is truly real and absolute” 
(GuW, 4:321/FK, 62; emphasis added). Indeed reflection philosophy, 
because of its formal starting point issuing in the hypostatisation of 
the antithesis, ipso facto fails to attain knowledge of what philosophy 
aims to be about: the Absolute, infinity, the truly real, that is, what is 
beyond mere belief and finite cognition and what is truly, uncondition-












This, then, is the main characteristic of reflection philosophy: it 
remains stuck in its reflective oppositions (mind/world, form/content, 
a priori/a posteriori, subject/object, unity/manifold, reality/ideality, 
finitude/infinity, etc.), while failing to reflect on these reflective oppo-
sitions, to take these oppositions into account as unreflected assump-
tions (insofar as their putative absoluteness is concerned). Paradoxically, 
Hegel in fact accuses reflection philosophy, including Kant’s, of a deter-
minate lack of reflection, precisely by taking the reflective starting point 
absolutely, as an unproblematic assumption. The result of this is relativ-
ism, subjectivism, psychologism, and an idealism that has not thought 
through its own reflective constructions and its own theoretical assump-
tions, instead absolutises these presupposed oppositions, issuing in a 
dogmatic philosophical dualism, which is unable to achieve what it is 
striving for: knowledge of what is truly real, without it being uncriti-
cally constrained by any unreflected assumption or presupposition. The 
main problem with reflection philosophy, including Kant’s, thus is 
its pervasive dualist outlook and the relativism or scepticism that this 
results in.
But especially in light of Kant’s notion of the synthetic a 
priori—Hegel’s appreciation of which will be addressed more in detail 
below—the dualism characteristic of reflection philosophy that one 
encounters in TD7 is internally inconsistent: for if conceptuality rests 
basically on an a priori synthesis, as Kant argues, “it surely contains 
determinateness and differentiation [Unterschied ] within itself ” (WL, 
12:23/SL, 520; emphasis added) and, since determination is first estab-
lished by means of a priori synthesis, determinateness—and thus the 
determinate difference or antithesis between form and content—is not 
provided by the sensible manifold, by content, externally, but is inter-
nal to a priori synthesis. It might seem that Hegel has a point that 
even if it is the case that the manifold is external to the concept, then 
its externality, and thus its distinction from the concept, is something 
that can only be determined from within the concept. To put this dif-
ferently, “differentiation is an equally essential moment of the concept” 
(WL, 12:22/SL, 519). Material content and “empty reflective identity” 
or “abstract universality” are not opposed to each other in the sense that 
they are really external to each other and “intrinsically separate” (an und 
für sich getrennt) (WL, 12:22/SL, 519–520).
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This is a conceptualist argument also often used by Kantians in 
fending off nonconceptualist readings of the relation between intui-
tion and concept (see Schulting 2016b). But of course, saying that the 
distinction between intuition and concept can only be determined 
within the perspective of conceptuality if conceptuality is the necessary 
condition of determination, as it is on Kant’s account, does not imply 
that intuition itself is conceptual, nor does it imply that intuition 
and concept are always coextensive (and intrinsically inseparable). 
This would appear to undercut any strong criticism of so-called 
dualist positions in reflection philosophy, specifically of what Hegel 
calls Kant’s “psychological reflex” (WL, 12:22/SL, 520) of seeing 
conceptuality as constrained by sensibility; Hegel appears to want 
to conflate conceptuality and intuition, to the extent that intuition is 
not just necessarily combined with conceptuality insofar as cognitive 
claims (made by the understanding) about objects are made, but is in 
fact necessarily conjoined with conceptuality simpliciter, regardless 
of the question whether the understanding makes actual claims about 
objects. Hegel sees Kant’s cognitive constraint, which can be expressed 
by the modal claim M*,8 discussed in Chap. 5, purely as the result of 
the aforementioned “psychological reflex” of a formal epistemological 
standpoint. But the result of such a strongly conceptualist critique of 
Kant’s epistemological modesty is that the absolute distinction that 
Kant carefully made between the forms of conceptuality and the forms 
of sensibility, in the context of a critique of the rationalists’ conceptual 
idealism, threatens to be blurred.9
8.3  Subjectivism and Kant’s Putative 
“Psychological Idealism”
As a result of Kant’s “reflective” bias, made manifest by his choice for a 
discursive type of logic, there is an emphasis, according to Hegel, on the 
purity of the concept, which consequently relies on empirical content 
to acquire meaning: Hegel speaks of the concept’s “emptiness [Leerheit] 
[which] gets its content and dimensions quite exclusively [schlechthin 












(GuW, 4:321/FK, 63; cf. GuW, 4:344). And because of this, Hegel 
believes, Kant’s idealism about objects (see Chap. 4) is nothing but a 
“completion and idealization of [Lockean] empirical psychology”, for 
which the highest standpoint is that of the subject’s viewpoint (GuW, 
4:322/FK, 63; cf. GuW, 4:326). On this view, the Kantian thesis about 
the objectivity of objects, the main claim of TD, does not establish 
the truth about the very things that exist in the world (as things in 
themselves), but is merely about the way in which we, as cognising 
subjects, take objects to be, how they appear to us as finite human 
beings, not how things are essentially. Hence, Kant’s idealism is merely 
a subjective idealism, “a subjective (banal) idealism” (Enz, 8:123/Enc, 
91), an “idealism of the finite” (GuW, 4:322/FK, 64), which ultimately 
takes the form of a scepticism, and hence is not the true, objective 
idealism that thinks the opposition of finite and infinite, of the sensuous 
and the supersensuous, of mind and world, thereby thinking their 
true unity, and thus true or “authentic reality” (GuW, 4:325/FK, 68). 
Hegel sometimes puts this in terms of a “middle term” that is lacking in 
reflection philosophy, whereby each of two extremes are nullified, come 
to nothing, in their very opposition or antithesis: it is this nullification as 
opposites which constitutes what Hegel calls the Absolute or absolute 
identity (GuW, 4:344, et passim). This “middle term” is lacking in 
reflective thought, which merely thinks in abstract oppositions (finite/
infinite, form/content, subject/object, etc.), and does not think the 
reciprocal mediation of the opposite terms.
It is clear that the premise of Hegel’s critique of Kant is the possi-
bility of thinking the absolute identity of the finite and the infinite, of 
the empirical manifold and the concept. Hegel dismisses Kant’s abso-
lute distinction between intuition and concept out of hand. This would 
appear to be begging the question against Kantian premises, as a result 
of which Hegel’s critique seems to be misdirected from the get-go. It 
would of course be fair to say that Hegel rightly criticises Kant for just 
accepting that human reason should be directed to the empirical, and 
that anything that is not measured by a possible empirical application 
amounts to empty sloganeering if one disagrees with Kant’s assertion 
that conceptual claims must have a basis in empirical reality, otherwise 
they lack real validity. It does seem, at first sight at least, that Hegel is 
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right to believe that in Kant’s hands philosophy is but an uncritical “cul-
ture of reflection raised to a system” (GuW, 4:322/FK, 64), nothing 
more than a common sense philosophy in fact (GuW, 4:322), whereby 
“genuine” (wahre) (GuW, 4:325) philosophy in terms of a philosophy 
that has the idea of “absolute objectivity” as its central topic is degraded 
as “empty musing” (GuW, 4:325/FK, 67); absolute objectivity or iden-
tity is, for Kant, at most a “postulate never to be realized” (GuW, 4:325/
FK, 68). And for Hegel, such a metaphilosophical stance smacks of an 
at heart anti-philosophical philosophy.
For Hegel, philosophy should rather start with, and have as its 
singular content, the idea of absolute objectivity—the idea that 
expresses the absolute “sublatedness of the antithesis” (das absolute 
Aufgehobensein des Gegensatzes) or “absolute identity”, which is the 
“only authentic reality” (GuW, 4:325/FK, 68; trans. emended)—not 
end with it as a mere postulate, as Kant does. What is meant by this 
is that it would be odd to assume that, for example, the distinction 
between mind and world, between subject and object, is a pre-
philosophical irreducible and absolute given; that would be uncritical 
from a purely philosophical point of view. Hegel accuses Kant of just 
such an uncritical assumption of a pre-philosophical given. The “only 
authentic reality” of which Hegel speaks is therefore not the truly true 
world outside the mind, but reality that no longer knows an absolute 
distinction between mind and world, a reality where mind is no longer 
external to the world, but also a reality where the world is no longer 
external to the mind. Hence, Hegel speaks of an “absolute identity of 
thought and being” (GuW, 4:345/FK, 94). Hegel’s view of idealism is 
one of a realism sans phrase, where neither mind nor world are reduced 
to each other.
By contrast, Kant’s Critical view requires an externally given, 
based on the fact that the logic to which Kant’s thinking is indebted 
is discursive, demanding a strict separation of two irreducible stems of 
knowledge (A15/B29), which must be combined only for the purposes 
of acquiring knowledge (A51–2/B75–6). Hegel criticises Kant’s reliance 
on sensations given in the empirical manifold in intuition as the only 
true means by which we have direct access to reality, i.e. to the things in 












as the means to have access to reality, is never explained by Kant, but 
just assumed as a fact—Hegel calls it something “incomprehensible” 
(GuW, 4:332/FK, 76) in Kant’s system of thought, something that 
is not accounted for. However, the assumption of the givenness of 
sensations and their relation to reality does not imply that Kant 
assumes—as Hegel has us believe—that there is an absolute distinction 
between mind and world, which cannot be bridged. The distinction 
between a formal ‘I think’ and a material given content (see further 
below, Sect. 8.4) might be read as such, but does in fact not support the 
metaphysical position that says that mind and world are distinguished 
in an absolute sense. Such a position would moreover conflict with 
Kant’s restriction thesis about the possibility of cognition of absolute 
truths. We have no insight into the truth about things in themselves, 
hence we cannot posit an absolute distinction between mind and world, 
as this would suggest that we do have insight into the truth about a 
relation between things in themselves.
It is with the above-sketched view that Hegel reads Kant. A very 
different general conception of philosophy than Kant’s thus lies at the 
root of Hegel’s critique of Kant. Yet Hegel believes that his critique of 
Kant is, at least to some extent, internal to Kant’s thought itself. The 
germ of this idea Hegel finds in Kant’s adage that “neither the concept 
in isolation nor intuition in isolation is anything at all; [and] that 
intuition by itself is blind and the concept by itself is empty” (GuW, 
4:326/FK, 68; cf. A51/B75). Here, Kant shows that only when 
both concept and intuition are connected with each other a form of 
objectivity, an identity between thought and being, is achieved. But the 
fact that Kant identifies this identity in consciousness, that is, in human 
experience, and does not qualify it in terms of a “rational cognition” 
(vernünftige Erkenntnis) (GuW, 4:326/FK, 68), means, according to 
Hegel, that Kant does not follow through on the promise of advancing 
the idea of absolute identity and absolute cognition (Erkennen des 
Absoluten) (GuW, 4:326/FK, 68), and thus “it falls back into absolute 
finitude and subjectivity” (GuW, 4:326/FK, 68). The identity here, 
the identity between concept (as the form of thought) and intuition 
(as the form of reality), is merely a “finite identity” (GuW, 4:326/
FK, 68), namely only to the extent that human, empirical cognition is 
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concerned. But Hegel thinks that this step is unwarranted on Kant’s 
own premises. This is the bad subjectivism that Hegel laments in Kant, 
namely, the ‘mere’ subjectivism that rests content with the finite identity 
of its cognition of empirical objects, and conflicts with the putative true 
speculative side of Kant’s thought (more on this later, in Sect. 8.4).
And therefore, in Hegel’s view, Kant’s transcendental idealism is 
in effect nothing but a “psychological idealism” (GuW, 4:331/FK, 
75), by which Hegel means that, importantly, the categories are “only 
determinations derived from self-consciousness” (WL, 12:22–23/
SL, 520), but are not determinations of, or instantiated in, the things 
in themselves. The relation between the subjective and the objective is 
just two different sides “of my subjective viewpoint” (meines subjektiven 
Betrachtens) (GuW, 4:332/FK, 76).10 The immediate problem with such 
a formal, merely subjective viewpoint—Kant’s alleged “psychological 
idealism” (GuW, 4:332/FK, 76)—is that the identity of the formal 
subject “finds itself immediately confronted by or next to an infinite 
non-identity, with which it must coalesce in some incomprehensible 
way” (GuW, 4:332/FK, 76). This “confrontation” concerns the 
subject’s relation to things in themselves via, and only via, the subject’s 
sensations. It is only by means of an act of determination, by the 
subject, of these sensations, which are encountered in inner sense, 
that the objects of our empirical cognition get their objective form 
(this occurs by means of the categories of quality: reality, negation, 
limitation).11 The objectivity is, as it were, imposed on the things that 
we encounter by virtue merely of our sensibility, and only on their 
subjective appearance, in sensibility. The “realm” of things in themselves 
itself, apart from the good services of the determining subject, which 
applies categories to sensible content in intuition, i.e. “[o]nce it is 
abandoned by the categories, […] cannot be anything but a formless 
lump” (GuW, 4:332/FK, 76); on Kant’s account, the realm of things 
in themselves is in effect nothing but “an infinity of sensations” (GuW, 
4:332/FK, 76). The manifold of sensibility, empirical consciousness, 
sensations, are all in themselves something “unintegrated” 
(Unverbundenes) (GuW, 4:330/FK, 74), and since sensibility is our only 
mode of access to things in themselves, if sensibility is not determined 












On Kant’s view, then, “the world is in itself falling to pieces”, which 
is only first given substantiality and objective coherence, even possibil-
ity and actuality, by the subject (GuW, 4:330/FK, 74). That even pos-
sibility (meant here is what Kant calls real possibility) and actuality are 
provided by the subject is only half true, for Kant makes a distinction 
between existence as given with things in themselves, and the determi-
nation of existence by means of the category of existence (see the discus-
sion in Chap. 9): the subject by no means provides the modal condition 
for the existence simpliciter of things (cf. A92/B125). Yet, in Hegel’s 
eyes, Kantian objective determination is solely and necessarily a deter-
mination projected by the human being (welche der Mensch hin-sieht, 
und hinauswirft) (GuW, 4:330) on the world and as such is unable to 
remove the antithesis between it and the things in themselves:
Objective determinateness and its forms first come in with the 
connection between them [the Ego and thing-in-itself ]; […] the thing in 
itself becomes object insofar as it obtains from the active subject some 
determination […]. Apart from this they are completely heterogeneous. 
(GuW, 4:331/FK, 75)
In this way, the objectivity of the categories, and their necessity, 
becomes something contingent and subjective again, for it does not 
determine things in themselves as such, but only from the perspective 
of subjective experience, as appearances.12 The knowledge about objects 
established by the understanding is not true knowledge of how things 
truly are. Notwithstanding the objective determination of objects that 
the understanding establishes by means of the categories, we remain 
fully incognisant of the true nature of objects, namely, as things in 
themselves. Or as Jacobi put it, “all our so-called knowledge is nothing 
but the organization of our ignorance” (as quoted by Harris 1977:15).
Hegel thus charges Kant’s idealism with restricting our knowledge to 
appearances, and hence precluding genuine, real knowledge of things in 
themselves. In fact, Hegel accuses Kant of a contradiction: it does not 
stand to reason to say, on the one hand, that the forms of  knowledge 
(the categories), by means of the original-synthetic unity of appercep-
tion, first establish the very objectivity of objects (the claim of B137 
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in the Critique), and then, on the other, to deny that those forms are 
instantiated by the objects whose essence is defined by them (WL, 
12:24), and instead apply to the subject’s own manifold of  sensations 
only. But it seems that Hegel here just conflates the conditions for 
the objectivity of objects (of knowledge) and the conditions for the 
 existence of objects, what makes objects things that have an existence 
independent of our knowledge of them (cf. the discussion in Chap. 4, 
Sect. 4.10). In Chap. 9, it shall be argued that what makes objects 
objects is not the same as what makes things things.
Strikingly, Hegel reasons that if what is determined by the 
understanding is only appearance, then the understanding itself can also 
only be appearance, and is nothing in itself:
The things, as they are cognized by the intellect, are only appearances. 
They are nothing in themselves, which is a perfectly truthful result. The 
obvious conclusion, however, is that an intellect which has cognizance only of 
appearances and of nothing in itself, is itself only appearance and is nothing 
in itself. But, on the contrary, Kant regards discursive intellect, with this 
sort of cognition, as in itself and absolute. Cognition of appearances is 
dogmatically regarded as the only kind of cognition there is, and rational 
cognition [Vernunfterkenntnis] is denied. If the forms through which 
the object exists are nothing in themselves, they must also be nothing in 
themselves for cognitive Reason [erkennende Vernunft]. Yet Kant never  
seems to have had the slightest doubt that the intellect is the absolute of the  
human spirit. The intellect is (for him) the absolute immovable [ fixierte], 
insuperable finitude of human Reason. (GuW 4:332–333/FK, 77)
The italicised sentence exhibits a strange inference: why would 
the fact that what we know by means of the understanding is only 
appearance and not knowledge of things in themselves, imply that the 
understanding is itself just an appearance, thereby undermining Kant’s 
claim that what we know by means of the understanding is absolute, 
“fixed”? The apparent contradiction here is: what determines something 
only as appearance (Erscheinung) and not an sich, cannot itself be 
said to be an an sich, hence is itself nothing but illusion (Schein), and 
merely subjectively valid. But, apart from the fact that Kant clearly 












never says that what the understanding determines is absolute, or that 
the understanding is itself absolute. Rather, we can determine that we 
only know appearances, precisely because we must determine from the 
limited perspective of the understanding—reason has no immediate 
insight into reality. Kant’s reasoning is internally consistent, because 
on account of the Copernican hypothesis we can only determine a 
priori of things what we have put into things beforehand (Bxviii). 
This has got nothing to do with a dogmatic assertion about the scope 
of our cognition, but instead shows a modesty regarding the reach 
of the understanding (and of reason). Surely, one cannot interpret 
modesty as itself dogmatic (see Ameriks 2000:288–291), which is what 
Hegelians often argue, nor must an insight regarding our limitations by 
implication amount to a limited, merely subjective and thus not a true 
or objectively valid, perspective, or worse, be mere Schein. Of course, 
from the Hegelian perspective of the Absolute, what the understanding 
determines is mere appearance, but this perspective begs the question 
against Kant.13
In the Science of Logic (WL, 12:17ff.), Hegel is more forthcoming 
about why he thinks that Kant’s conclusion that categorial knowledge 
is not about things in themselves is contradictory. In Hegel’s reasoning, 
the object in the intuition is still something “external, alien”, a mere 
“appearance” (WL, 12:18/SL, 516), which through thought is being 
changed into a Gesetztsein, a thing that is no longer just something that 
presents itself in its immediacy, but is something posited, by reason, as 
being a thing, an object. Although the object has An-und-fürsichsein 
already inchoately in intuition, it is only really an und für sich if it is 
so apprehended in thought. When the object is indeed apprehended in 
thought, in Hegel’s view, it is no longer an Erscheinung, but genuinely 
a thing in itself that is also grasped as such by thought, something-
in-and-for-itself. Its genuine An-und-fürsichsein is its objectivity 
for thought. Hegel thus has an entirely different understanding of 
Erscheinung than Kant, even though he presents it as in line with the 
essence at least of Kant’s own view in TD. In Kant’s view, however, 
clearly an Erscheinung does not get suddenly changed into a thing in 
itself, when it is determined by the categories of the understanding. 
This explains to a large extent why Hegel thinks Kant’s idealism is a 
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defective, merely “psychological” idealism, but also, and by the same 
token, why Hegel is mistaken about a central plank of Kant’s idealism 
about objects.
8.4  Distinguishing Between the “Empty ‘I’” 
and the “True ‘I’”: The Clue to Hegel’s 
Misreading of TD
Despite Hegel’s general dismissiveness about Kant having “decided 
without reservation for appearance” (GuW, 4:341/FK, 90), which 
shows his idealism to be “psychological” at heart, and that, in Kant’s 
reflection philosophy, “the highest Idea [is] corrupted with full 
consciousness”, Hegel nonetheless does believe there to be a “truly 
speculative” side to Kant’s philosophy (GuW, 4:343/FK, 92). This “truly 
speculative aspect of Kant’s philosophy” (GuW, 4:343/FK, 92) concerns 
his notion of the productive or transcendental imagination. Hegel 
writes:
[W]e must […] place Kant’s merit […] in his having put the Idea of 
authentic a priority in the form of transcendental imagination; and 
also in his having put the beginning of the Idea of Reason in the intel-
lect itself. For he regarded thinking, or the form, not as something sub-
jective, but as something in itself; not as something formless, not as 
empty apperception, but as intellect, as true form, namely as triplicity 
[Triplizität]. The germ of speculation [Keim des Spekulativen] lies in this  
triplicity alone. For the root judgment [ursprüngliches Urteil ], or duality, 
is in it as well, and hence the very possibility of a posteriority, which in 
this way ceases to be absolutely opposed to the a priori, while the a priori, 
for this reason, also ceases to be formal identity. We will touch later on 
the still purer Idea of an intellect that is at the same time a posteriori, the 
Idea of an intuitive intellect as the absolute middle. (GuW, 4:334–335/
FK, 79–80)
Apart from the imagination, there are two additional key terms that 












argument of TD: Triplizität and the intuitive intellect. Though highly 
interesting and extremely relevant to an understanding of Hegel’s own 
project and his relation to Kant, I shall not be able to discuss the latter, 
as this would require a deeper analysis than I have space for here; the 
role and significance of the intuitive intellect in Hegel’s understanding 
of Kant is also not undisputed.14 At any rate, from the text of Faith 
and Knowledge it is evident that, one way or the other, like Schelling 
the early Hegel takes inspiration from Kant’s discussion of the 
intuitive intellect in §§76–77 of the Third Critique, which he takes 
as confirmation of his reading of Kant’s arguments in TD about the 
productive imagination as the original-synthetic unity.
Here, I shall concentrate on his notion of triplicity (Triplizität). 
What Hegel singles out for special status in Kant’s account in TD is the 
notion of the “original synthetic unity of apperception” (GuW, 4:327/
FK, 69), or the “original identity of self-consciousness” (GuW, 4:328/
FK, 71) (cf. B131–6), which Hegel identifies with the transcendental 
imagination. This original-synthetic unity is an important idea “because 
of its two-sidedness, the opposites being absolutely one in it” (GuW, 
4:328/FK, 71). This, then, is what the notion of triplicity conveys: an 
original unity or identity in which opposites are primordially united 
and, importantly, within which they are also first differentiable; indeed, 
triplicity is reflected by Kant’s central idea of the synthetic a priori of 
concept and intuition.
As Kant indeed argues in §15 of the B-Deduction,15 the  original- 
synthetic unity of apperception is not a synthetic unity that is an 
a posteriori aggregated unity, a unity of “an aggregate of  manifolds 
which are first picked up” by a unifying subject, but, as Hegel argues, 
a “true synthetic unity or rational identity”, i.e. “that identity which 
is the connecting of the manifold with the empty identity, the Ego”, 
or “the concept”. From this original-synthetic unity, “the Ego  as 
thinking subject” and “the manifold as body and world first detach 
 themselves”. The productive imagination or the original-synthetic unity 
of apperception should not be seen as a “middle term” (Mittelbegriff ) 
which is positioned between, on the one hand, “an existing absolute” 
but empty formal ‘I’ of the subject of understanding, and, on the other, 
the “difference” of the manifold in intuition, i.e. “an absolute existing 
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world”. Rather, the productive imagination lies at the root of both the 
formal subject of understanding and the world of objects (GuW, 4:328–
329/FK, 71, 73).
Here, then, lies the clue to Hegel’s reading of Kant’s notion of the 
synthetic a priori, while simultaneously suggesting that it is Kant’s 
most speculative idea, showing the reality of absolute objectivity, and 
claiming that it provides an internal critique of Kant. This last aspect 
concerns the alleged fact that while Kant introduces the speculative 
idea, in the form of the original-synthetic unity of apperception, 
he does not himself adhere to it, for he reallocates this speculative 
principle to the mere understanding—that is, “he expresse[s] [the Idea] 
and [subsequently] consciously destroy[s] it again” (GuW, 4:335/
FK, 80). The clue is the distinction that Hegel makes between, on the 
one hand, a so-called “empty identity”, or “formal identity”, or the 
“abstract Ego”, and, on the other, “the true Ego”, which is an “absolute, 
original synthetic identity, which is the principle” (all quotations 
from GuW, 4:328, 331/FK, 71–72, 75), namely, the principle of 
original-synthetic unity of apperception.16 Significantly, Hegel says 
that TD cannot be understood unless one distinguishes between the 
representing (accompanying) ‘I’ (Kant’s ‘I think’), which is the subject 
of thought, from the original-synthetic unity of apperception, that is, 
the productive imagination, between the “empty Ego” and the “true 
Ego”. What licenses Hegel to make a distinction between these two 
‘Ego’s? And what is the connection with the notion of productive or 
transcendental imagination?
Hegel wants to argue that the transcendental imagination, which 
according to him is the “true ‘I’”, or the original-synthetic identity, is 
not the understanding, or the reflecting or judging or accompanying 
‘I’, or judgement. For, as Hegel argues, the understanding, the reflect-
ing ‘I’ and judgement first appear as one of the opposites that are origi-
nally united in the original-synthetic unity. The original-synthetic unity 
is present in both opposites respectively, in the understanding, which 
is the reflecting subject, as well as “immersed”, undifferentiated, in the 
manifold of intuition (GuW, 4:327/FK, 70). However, it is, logically, 
not present as the absolute identity of opposites, but merely as a rela-












as in the understanding, which differentiates itself from the manifold, 
or even more so in judgement, which shows that opposition literally, 
namely in the way predicates and subjects are visibly divorced (S is P).17 
Whereas in the sensible manifold neither the relative difference nor the 
relative identity between it and the form of the understanding come to 
the fore—in it, “identity is completely identical with the difference just 
as it is in the magnet” (GuW, 4:327/FK, 70)—in the understanding 
a relative identity, and thus a relative difference, with the manifold in 
intuition is made explicit, by the manner in which the understanding or 
conceptuality places itself over against empirical content or sensibility. 
This “placing itself over against” marks out discursive (Kantian) concep-
tuality essentially; it shows the dualism inherent to discursive conceptu-
ality. Hegel writes:
[T]he synthetic unity is only concept because it binds the difference in 
such a way that it also steps outside of it, and faces it in relative antithesis. 
In isolation the pure concept is the empty identity. It is only as being 
relatively identical with that which it stands against, that it is concept. 
(GuW, 4:328/FK, 70).
Hegel takes Kant at his word that through the accompanying ‘I’ 
no manifold is given (B135), hence it is an “empty ‘I’”. Since it is 
merely formal, the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’ is dependent on a manifold of 
representations for thought content. But he also takes Kant to mean 
that the “empty ‘I’” first arises out of the absolute identity with the 
manifold, so that the differentiation between the formal, empty ‘I’ 
and the manifold is secondary with respect to the original-synthetic 
unity, the absolute identity, which alone is the “true I”—which, in 
Hegel’s understanding, makes the formal, empty, accompanying ‘I’ a 
derivative ‘I’, compared to the original-synthetic unity of appercep-
tion. But this just begs the question against Kant, who argues, quite 
clearly, in §16 of the B-Deduction, that the accompanying ‘I’ of the 
‘I think’ of  self-consciousness is the non-derivative original ‘I’ of the 
identity of  self-consciousness, which is grounded in an original act 
of a priori synthesis (for extensive discussion, see Schulting 2012, 
esp. Chap. 6). The fact that the act of accompanying is grounded 
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in the a priori synthesis does not license a sharp separation between 
the two, in the way that Hegel suggests, namely, that the one empty 
‘I’ of the understanding is derivative of and secondary to the true ‘I’ of 
the transcendental imagination (i.e. the original-synthetic unity). The 
grounding is a logical grounding, which means that for every act of 
accompanying her representations by a reflective ‘I’, there is an instance 
of a priori synthesis, and, reciprocally, every instance of a priori synthe-
sis ipso facto entails an act of accompanying. The analytic unity of the ‘I 
think’ accompanying her representations is “rigorously coextensive”, as 
I put it in Schulting (2012), with a priori synthesis (see B133–4). This 
means that no a priori synthesis fails to result in an act of accompanying 
by the ‘I think’, and no act of such accompanying is not grounded in 
an a priori synthesis. For the ‘I think’ and original-synthetic appercep-
tion reduce to the same act of self-conscious thinking, for every actual 
instance of self-consciousness, that is, in Kant’s account, every actual 
instance of judgement. There is nothing in Kant’s account that suggests 
that the understanding, or judgement, or the accompanying ‘I think’ is 
not the original apperception, which is an original a priori act of synthe-
sis or an original-synthetic unity.
I cannot here rehearse the very complicated story of Kant’s view of 
original, transcendental self-consciousness, but the prising apart of 
the ‘I’ that accompanies her representations from the original self-
consciousness, as Hegel does, is at any rate not at all warranted. Not only 
is it not warranted, but it also makes it hard to understand how Hegel’s 
reading comports with Kant’s emphatic notion of self-consciousness 
as having to do with an act of spontaneity: it appears that Hegel wants 
to divorce the idea of the original-synthetic unity or identity from any 
kind of activity on the part of the thinking subject, indeed from the ‘I’ 
that accompanies her representations (this seems similar to McDowell, 
as I suggested in Chap. 5). For Kant, the original-synthetic unity 
between subject and object, between the form of our thinking and the 
material content in sensibility is not a given, primordial identity, even 
if an a priori one, but something that needs to be established in an 
act of understanding, by a subject aware of her act of accompanying, 













Hegel accuses Kant of both, contradictorily, arguing that the original-
synthetic unity lies at the root of every possible combination of oppo-
sites (understanding and sensibility) and assuming that the very faculty 
that establishes this original-synthetic unity is also opposed to that which 
it unites, in other words, is also one of the opposites in the combination. In 
other words, that which unites opposites cannot itself be a component 
in that unity, namely, one of the opposites. This charge is the nub of 
Hegel’s claim that Kant’s account is internally contradictory, or at least 
not true to its most speculatively promising insight. But the alleged 
contradiction arises only because Hegel distinguishes sharply between 
the empty ‘I’ and the true ‘I’, where only the latter is the unity of oppo-
sites, and the former is merely one of the opposites. Hegel’s criticism 
thus begs the question against Kant’s claim that the understanding, by 
means of the productive imagination in sensibility (cf. B151–2), is itself 
the original-synthetic unity of apperception.
By virtue of a misapprehension of the merely formal distinction 
between the accompanying ‘I think’, i.e. the ‘I’ expressing the analytical 
unity of apperception, and the true ‘I’ of the original-synthetic unity of 
apperception, Hegel unjustifiably prises apart the productive imagina-
tion and the understanding, and thereby subtly shifts the idea of a priori 
synthesis—as that which, from a formal perspective, combines material 
content (as in Kant)—to an idea of a priori synthesis that a priori com-
bines form and material content simpliciter, i.e. absolutely. In the latter 
perspective, form can then no longer be seen as outside the a priori com-
bination between form and content, because it is itself part of the com-
bination. It would then be inconsistent for Kant, as Hegel argues, to 
hold that material content must be pre-given, that is, must be provided 
from outside form or the formal perspective of the combining subject 
of the understanding. Material content and form of thought are always 
already conjoined. But if the claim of unity in a manifold of representa-
tions in intuition is conditional, namely, insofar as the manifold is united 
by an act of the understanding, is there a unity in the manifold in intui-
tion, then there is no inconsistency in Kant’s argument in the way that 
Hegel claims. And indeed the inconsistency charge does not hold up, 
because for Kant the original-synthetic unity is never a unity between 
form and matter, mind and world, simpliciter or unconditionally. Only 
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insofar as content is a priori determined, by means of the binding capac-
ity of the understanding by virtue of the imagination, is there a unity 
between form and content, sensibility and understanding (see Schulting 
2016b). By contrast, Hegel believes this binding force, i.e. the orig-
inal-synthetic unity of apperception, to be present already in sensibil-
ity tout court in an inchoate form, implicitly, and only subsequently 
made explicit in the understanding and judgement—this is similar to 
McDowell’s reasoning that the conceptual capacities are already opera-
tive in sensibility but do not necessarily figure in discursive activity or 
in judgement (see the account of McDowell’s position in Chap. 5). For 
Hegel, as for McDowell, the actualisation of conceptual capacities that 
originally bind form and content is not due to the understanding, or 
due to an act of judgement, even if it is or can (and must) be made 
explicit in judgement in order for a conceptual cognition to arise out of 
it. That which is responsible for such an actualisation in sensibility is, 
according to Hegel, purely and only the productive imagination.
It is clear that Hegel regards pure intuition and pure concepts 
as abstract, and empty forms, which do not have an independent 
being. It is not the case, in his view, that the dualism of manifold and 
understanding, the antithesis, must be seen as primordial. The mani-
fold does not exist independently of the principle of synthetic unity, 
Hegel says (GuW, 4:328). This excludes the possibility of essentially 
nonconceptual content, content that is not always already conjoined 
with conceptual form, even if only rudimentarily. There is no reality 
outside conceptual form, which the latter must in some conceptu-
ally incomprehensible sense be applied to. Also in the Greater Logic 
(WL, 12:20–22), Hegel argues that Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
mistakenly assumes an absolute opposition between the form of 
thought and material content, which should provide reality to the con-
cept, as if this content as our access to reality were independently and 
beforehand available or present—this is in conformity with how Hegel 
interprets Kant’s putative view that reality cannot be “conjur[ed] out 
of ” (heraus zu klauben) (GuW, 4:325/FK, 67) concepts, alluding to 
Kant’s critique of the ontological proof of God’s existence (Kant indeed 
uses the term ausklauben at A603/B631). The stuff of sensibility or 












to the concept”, Hegel says (WL, 12:21/SL, 518).18 But Kant does of 
course not presuppose that objective reality is given outside  determinate 
conceptuality. He does assume that objective reality is given (from the 
empirical perspective), even if this assumption is not thereby already 
philosophically justified (see the argument in Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2); yet 
he also argues that objective reality is necessarily grounded on  certain 
conditions of possibility insofar as what is given is conceptually 
determined as objectively real (from the transcendental perspective). 
Sensibility, for Kant, is not the real, but merely refers to it, insofar as 
its material aspect is concerned, not insofar as its constitutive form is 
concerned (which is dependent on the understanding, and the forms of 
intuition, space and time). But of course, it cannot be denied that there 
remains an unbridgeable disparity between Kant’s and Hegel’s views of 
what amounts to objective reality.19
8.5  Conclusion: The “Speculative Idea” 
“Through the Shallowness” of the 
Deduction
In Hegel’s opinion, Kant privileges the “unity of reflection” (GuW, 
4:325/FK, 67) as the highest standpoint of philosophy. He remains 
stuck in oppositions: mind and world, form and content, ‘I’ and nature, 
etc. Hegel’s view of philosophy, by contrast, is that the idea of “absolute 
objectivity” is the “absolute sublatedness [Aufgehobensein]” (GuW, 
4:325/FK, 67–68; trans. emended) of such oppositions, which thus 
is the “only authentic reality” (GuW, 4:325/FK, 68) at which genuine 
philosophy should aim. True idealism is the acknowledgment that 
neither opposites (body/soul, ‘I’/nature, form/content, mind/world) 
have independent existence—that is, as such they are “nothing” (GuW, 
4:325/FK, 68). Hegel sees this true idealism in Kant’s adage that neither 
concept nor intuition have independent existence (this is at any rate 
how he reads it), or indeed in his famous question “How are synthetic 
a priori judgments possible?” (GuW, 4:327/FK, 69), which expresses 
an original identity of heterogeneous elements. But unfortunately, 
when parsing Kant’s arguments in TD, Hegel believes “[o]ne can 
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[only] glimpse this Idea through the shallowness of the deduction of 
the categories” (GuW, 4:327/FK, 69). While this idea of a primordial 
identity of what is different or dissimilar is Kant’s truly vernünftige 
insight, he again squanders it, Hegel says, by declaring finite cognition, 
in virtue of the merely “formal identity” of the understanding, to be the 
only legitimate form of knowledge.
But I have argued that Hegel’s reading of Kant starts from a very dif-
ferent assumption, namely, that dualistic positions are uncritical and 
thus unjustifiable in real philosophy. Kant’s methodological starting 
point is, prima facie, quite unalike. Kant thinks in terms of differentia-
ble elements of cognition, through analysis, with a view to seeking their 
unity in cognition. The synthetic a priori is not an assumption; it must 
first be shown to obtain by virtue of an “analysis of the faculty of the 
understanding” (A65/B90). Hegel focuses on the synthetic character of 
thought in a much broader sense, not necessarily just empirical cogni-
tion, and it seems Hegel’s basic assumption is the reality of the synthetic 
a priori, which can be shown to be manifest in the way that we think 
about being tout court, specifically in the Greater Logic. Both Kant 
and Hegel look for the element of synthetic unity that lies a priori in 
thought, whether in the narrower (Kant) or broader (Hegel) sense, but 
from a different angle: Hegel seeks consistently for the unity of reason 
in the employment of concepts, whereas Kant looks for the synthetic 
unity that lies in acts of the understanding in empirical judgements about 
objects, insofar as these judgements are objectively valid. Kant indeed 
works, as Hegel claims, with differential terms of reflection (form/con-
tent; a priori/a posteriori; subject/object; ‘I’/nature), but he does not 
identify these with metaphysical entities; they just serve the formal anal-
ysis of the possibility of empirical cognition. Kant is not a metaphysical 
dualist by conviction. Yet Hegel charges Kant with “fixing” or “absolut-
ising” the terms of reflection in their opposition, suggesting that Kant 
does give them a metaphysical status. The result of this “fixing”, accord-
ing to Hegel, is that one never achieves real rational unity, that is, unity 
from the perspective of reason (rather than from the perspective of the 
narrower understanding) between the various terms of reflection, and so 
real, unconditioned unity between subject and object, form and matter, 












But the difference between Hegel’s and Kant’s approaches cannot 
be sublated in a Hegelian-type dialectic, for, despite their shared focus 
on the synthetic unity in thought, their methodologies and start-
ing assumptions are irreducibly different. To put it succinctly, Hegel’s 
critique of Kant begs the question against Kant’s own philosophi-
cal methodology, which is based on a discursive logic; it can therefore 
not be an internal critique if it does not accept the philosophical 
methodology (or at least account for the differences in methodologies, 
which to all appearances Hegel fails to do). Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s 
discursive logic is legitimate to the extent that we accept Hegel’s general 
assumptions about what philosophy is supposed to be; but any critique 
of Kant must take into account those assumptions. No philosophical sys-
tem is viewpoint neutral. Yet it is precisely Hegel’s quintessential belief 
that philosophy must and indeed can be viewpoint neutral, and that his 
own absolute idealism provides just the means to achieving such view-
point neutrality. Hegel’s bias is one that consistently seeks the unity of 
thought from within the broad perspective of reason, asking the ques-
tion of what is rational, while Kant’s focus on unity is aimed at justify-
ing the employment of a priori concepts in particular judgements about 
objects, that is, in order to make empirically justified knowledge claims 
about the world. Hegel’s aim is more concerned with the intra-concep-
tual coherence or consistency of such and other knowledge claims or 
employment of concepts within the larger context of concept use and its 
systematic and historical conditions.20
All in all, the Hegelian criticism that Kant’s philosophical meth-
odology must be seen as resulting from contradictions in Kant’s own 
thought, or that Kant himself alludes to the viewpoint neutrality of 
absolute idealism, that is, the speculative idea of an absolute identity, 
even if merely inchoately, fails, as I have argued, because Hegel misap-
prehends the intimate relation between the accompanying (putatively 
merely reflective) ‘I’ of the understanding and the original-synthetic 
unity, the latter of which he rightly associates with the productive 
imagination but wrongly dissociates from the understanding. Hence, 
whatever the merits of Hegel’s own philosophical beliefs and the con-
sequences of his critique of Kant for his own thought, Hegel’s so-called 
internal critique of Kant does not stand up to scrutiny.
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Notes
 1. For exceptions, see Reich (2001), Longuenesse (1998), and in particular 
Schulting (2012).
 2. Cf. Pippin (2005:32). See also my discussion of Pippin’s views in 
Chap. 3 (this volume).
 3. See, by contrast, Houlgate (2005), who believes there is a chasm 
between Hegel’s critique of Kant in Faith and Knowledge and Hegel’s 
later philosophy. My view in this respect agrees with that of Sedgwick 
(2012), who thinks there is deep continuity between the early (Faith 
and Knowledge) and later (the Logics) views, even if of course Hegel’s 
later system of thought has developed beyond the rudiments of the 
account in Faith and Knowledge.
 4. For a recent discussion of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s subjectivism, see 
especially Houlgate (2015) and Ameriks (2015). To a large extent, I 
agree with Ameriks’s criticisms of Houlgate, but I think that Ameriks 
underestimates Kant’s own subjectivism, particularly concerning the 
so-called Copernican turn that Houlgate rightly highlights as involving 
our conceptuality as much as our sensibility. In other words, unlike 
Ameriks, I believe that Kant’s idealism already affects his theory of 
concepts (see further Chap. 9).
 5. I also largely refrain from commenting on the vast secondary literature 
on Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Important discus-
sions are found, among many more, in Ameriks (2000, 2015), Bowman 
(2013), Bristow (2007), Düsing (1995, 2013), Ferrarin (2016), Görland 
(1966), Horstmann (2004), Houlgate (2005, 2015), Longuenesse 
(2015, Part II), Kreines (2015), McDowell (2009), Pippin (1989, 1993, 
2005, 2014, 2016), Redding (2010), Sedgwick (1992, 1993, 2001, 2005, 
2012), the essays in Verra (1981) and Westphal (1996, 2000). See also my 
review of Bristow’s book in Schulting (2009) and my review of Sedgwick 
(2012) in Schulting (2016a). I discuss Pippin’s reading of Hegel’s critique 
of Kant extensively in two separate essays (Schulting 2016b, c).
 6. Sedgwick (2012, passim) highlights this element of Hegel’s critique 
of Kant: conceptuality and sensibility are mutually determining, 
in contrast to Kant’s emphasis on the determination, by the under-
standing, of sensibility, as the merely determinable.
 7. “The entire deduction is [merely] an analysis of experience and it posits 












 8. (M*) Necessarily, if intuitions are to be seen as contributing to possible 
knowledge of objects, then intuitions are subsumed under the catego-
ries as the conceptual conditions under which knowledge of objects is 
possible.
 9. See further my account in Schulting (2016b).
 10. This comment might appear to conflict with Hegel’s later, true 
interpretation of Kant’s main claim that objectivity is indeed nothing 
but the unity of self-consciousness (WL, 12:18). But the unity of 
self-consciousness that is meant there is the “true ‘I’”, of which Hegel 
speaks in Faith and Knowledge, not the so-called reflective or “empty 
‘I’” of the ‘I think’ accompanying my representations, which he 
dismisses as merely empirical. See further Sect. 8.4.
 11. See Schulting (2012, Chap. 8). See also Chap. 9 (this volume).
 12. See also WL, 12:21–22. Hegel’s critique of Kant here is not arbitrary, 
for the claim that Kant’s subjectivism/restriction thesis is not licensed 
follows from Hegel’s belief that the manifold in intuition is already 
sublated in the concept, thus showing its essence, and so it cannot be 
claimed that in the end the concept is again merely applicable to the 
manifold in intuition.
 13. But see Schulting (2016c) for a more favourable view of the relation 
between Kant’s and Hegel’s metaphysical logics.
 14. See e.g. Westphal (2000).
 15. Notice that, like Hegel, neither Kant sees the a priori synthetic unity as 
a product of an act of combination, but sees it as lying at the root of any 
necessary combination (see B129–31). Cf. Schulting (2012:141ff.).
 16. Cf. Sedgwick (2005).
 17. Judgement is paradigmatic for the relative identity of the formal ‘I’ or 
formal identity of the understanding, which is derivative of the “true 
‘I’” underlying it. The “true ‘I’” is the original “identity, as the uncon-
ditioned, [which] sunders itself, and appears as separated into the form 
of a judgment, as subject and predicate, or particular and universal” 
(GuW, 4:328/FK, 72). Judgement is “the prevailing appearance of 
 difference” (trans. mine), and the original identity is only visible in the 
copula in a judgement, but it “is not something thought, something 
cognized; on the contrary it expresses precisely our non-cognizance of 
the rational” (GuW 4:329/FK, 72). Judgement only shows the antith-
esis of the particular and the universal, of subject and object, not their 
identity or unity. It appears that Hegel takes the copula ‘is’ to be deriva-
tive of the Being that lies at the root of the judgement, reminiscent of 
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Hölderlin’s view of judgement as the “diremption” of original Being. 
For Hegel, original Being is Reason itself.
 18. Indeed, Hegel comes to argue, in the Logic, that reality is in fact 
derived or generated from the concept (WL, 12:24–25/SL, 522), con-
trary to Kant’s view that existence cannot be produced by the under-
standing or reason. Reality is not something external, in Hegel’s view, 
“but must be derived from the concept itself in accordance with scien-
tific requirements” (WL, 12:21/SL, 518). The sensible or intuition is 
prior to, or given before, conceptual understanding, insofar as it will be 
made clear that reason is their condition. That reason is their ground is 
shown by the way that reason proceeds from “the dialectic” or “noth-
ingness” of sensibility or intuition (WL, 12:21/SL, 519). Unlike for 
Kant, the truth of concepts is not at all conditioned on their being 
applied to sensibility or intuition (WL, 12:20–22). (Hegel does not dis-
tinguish between the formal and material, existential aspects of reality, 
as does Kant.)
 19. See further Schulting (2016c).
 20. See further the discussion in Schulting (2016c).
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